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Middle East Conflicts, all linked to one another, are getting out of hand and becoming 
resistant to any external mediation. The United States is seemingly displaying a new-found 
interest in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict after the failed attempt of 2009. President 
Obama seems to be behind these efforts, as he certainly would like to leave a positive 
“legacy” of involvement in the Middle East. However, he may be underestimating the 
difficulty of the task at hand after the upheavals brought about by the “Arab Spring” and 
overestimating U.S. influence in the Middle East, especially after the upheavals brought 
about by the “Arab Spring.” More than ever, local and regional dynamics, not external 
mediators, are dictating the magnitude and direction of change. The simple and obstinate 
fact is that the greatest obstacle to peace today is not differences of opinion on the scope 
of a balanced agreement between Arabs and Israelis but the behaviour of internal political 
forces on both sides. These are currently making any kind of agreement impossible and 
are increasingly impervious to the either U.S. or other influences. 
The „sudden‟ eruption of hostilities in Gaza two week ago is symptomatic of this problem 
and illustrates its murky dimensions of the problem. As usual, Israel has justified the new 
outbreak by asserting its “right to self-defence” and the need to improve its capacity to 
deter and reduce the military capabilities of its opponent. As usual in Israeli-Arab armed 
conflicts, there were a strikingly higher number of casualties on the Palestinian side. The 
Palestinians have underlined on several occasions that Israel‟s use of “house demolitions” 
as a military tactic is a blatant violation of international law and constitutes collective 
punishment against the Palestinian civilian population. The Palestinians too insist that they 
have the right to show “resistance" to an enemy, defend their “honour” and rights and ask 
for “justice.” Once again, the international community has urged both sides to exercise the 
utmost restraint and fully respect their obligations under international humanitarian law. 
However, with these demands the main regional players are merely paying mere lip service 
to Israelis and Palestinians‟ international responsibilities. They are also not taking into 
account changes which have occurred in the last few years and make previous rhetoric 
redundant. 
The uncompromising but complex nature of the domestic policies now being pursued in 
both Israel and occupied territories is one of these changes, but there are others. The 
threat of a massive attack from Arab armies, which once hung over Israel, has faded over 
the past few decades. Israeli concerns about a possible “surprise attack” are not longer 
valid, and therefore the need to occupy territories to establish buffer zones and use them 
as bargaining chips during negotiation. Actually, these territories have become a millstone 
for Israel. 
Two intifadas and several short wars of marginal benefit, including two in Lebanon (1982, 
2006) and two in Gaza (2008, 2012), suggest that the threats to Israel‟s survival are more 
complex than the perception Israeli leaders have of them. Israel‟s fixation on territorial 
expansion serves badly its cause, although one could argue that the growth of Israeli 
settlements is due to Palestinians‟ hesitation – or complete refusal – to negotiate a treaty 
with Israel. Delaying talks means that Palestinians will negotiate for a smaller piece of land. 
With the advent of short and mid-range missiles, distance from the enemy, in the military 
sector, has notionally shrunk to virtual nothingness. Palestinian militants could target 
Israel‟s commercial capital Tel Aviv with missiles fired from the Gaza Strip. Fortunately for 
Israel, its missile defense system managed to neutralize much of these short-range 
missiles. 
Three major factors have altered the strategic landscape. First, demographic trends 
detrimental to Israel could cause Jews to become a minority in their own country before 
long. This would make most Jews nervous and unsure about their position in the Israel 
established as their homeland. Control of the occupied territories exacerbates this threat. 
That‟s why former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon orchestrated Israel‟s unilateral 
disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2004-05.At the same time, Israel cannot afford to 
countenance “unmanaged areas” adjacent to its recognised pre-1967 territory, as these 
could be infiltrated by extremists and trigger clashes at any time. 
Second, the radicalisation and islamisation (via groups such as Hamas) of the Palestinian 
opposition, previously secular and represented by the Palestinian Authority, have seriously 
changed the political equation for Israel. The Salafists, Jihadists and self-proclaimed 
members of the “resistance front”, which includes Hezbollah, Syria and Iran, are now in a 
position to exacerbate long held antagonisms by sponsoring groups (such as the Islamic 
Jihad) or providing sophisticated weapons, including short-range and – maybe soon – mid-
range missiles. 
Third, Iran‟s acquisition of nuclear bombs and long-range missiles (most likely from North 
Korea) would threaten to disrupt an already fragile strategic balance in the region. At the 
very least, the atomic bomb being in the hands of the Iranians will force Israel and other 
regional and international stakeholders to review their current calculations of strategic 
advantage, state alliances and nuclear retaliation scenarios. Some observers saw Israel‟s 
military operations against Gaza in 2008 and 2012 primarily as attempts to deter Iran as 
much as Hamas from attacking Israeli territory, deterrence being defined as attempts to 
manipulate a target‟s behaviour through conditional threats. 
Where are we now? The prospects of achieving a two-state solution are becoming ever 
more remote, while the desire to embark on a new peace process has weakened in the 
aftermath of the November events. However, the Arab Spring has also created new 
opportunities which could lead to new solutions. Israeli strategists would do well to 
understand this and give up conducting periodic “operations” which inflate bitterness on 
both sides, while leave the conflict still unresolved. The idea that giving the process more 
time will help build mutual confidence and respect between the different actors is illusory. 
Pursuing such a course further complicates an already unworkable relationship. 
Domestic factors prevent Israeli and the Palestinian actors from constructively changing 
the situation on the ground. For example, the fact that Hamas (considered a terrorist 
organisation by Israel and the United States) now refuses to accept the idea or validity of 
the two-state solution has transformed a difficult but resolvable territorial conflict into an 
eternal ideological one. 
In the absence of courageous political leadership, only a serious upheaval or crisis could 
shake up, here and there, rigid political configurations now prevailing on both territories and 
discard the belief that old solutions will somehow bring an end to the conflict. Perhaps next 
year the international crisis expected as a result of the Iranian nuclear program will bring 
about salutary changes in this 64-year-old conflict. 
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